Note: This is the second in a series looking at all the Gators QBs (Kadarius Toney, Kyle Trask, Jake Allen, Emory Jones, Jaylin Jackson and Feleipe Franks). Click on the links to read the other breakdowns.
Gators QB Feleipe Franks had a rough 2017.
If you’re reading this, I don’t likely have to tell you that. You watched as he was pulled from the opener against Michigan for Malik Zaire and the third game against Kentucky for Luke Del Rio. And you saw the struggles against Georgia and Florida State after head coach Jim McElwain was fired.
Franks’ QB rating of 113.3 was 111th out of 125 qualified signal callers. His completion percentage (54.6) ranked 110th. His yards per attempt (6.3) ranked 109th. So Franks wasn’t efficient at completing his passes and they weren’t very far down the field. That’s not a recipe for success.
There is no debate that he has a cannon for an arm. And he’s fairly accurate on deep passes. The opening pass against Michigan was perfectly dropped in to Josh Hammond. And while he struggled for the first three quarters against Tennessee, in the fourth quarter he threw a dime that was dropped by a diving Kadarius Toney and then put the ball right on Tyrie Cleveland’s hands on the final play.
And that’s the conundrum with Franks. The ability is there. The question is whether it was him holding the McElwain/Nussmeier offense back or vice-versa. Based on the history of QB play under Nussmeier, I don’t think it’s fair to only blame Franks.
Going back to his time at Fresno State, Nussmeier has become offensive coordinator with an incumbent QB four times. Three of those times (Tom Brandstater, Devin Gardner and Treon Harris), the QBs efficiency has significantly decreased, by an average of 22 points.
The only time the QB improved was when Nussmeier took over for McElwain at Alabama with A.J. McCarron. But as I detailed two weeks ago, McCarron was a QB who showed excellent accuracy immediately under McElwain. That kind of QB fits what Nussmeier wants to do.
Franks doesn’t have that kind of accuracy, with a 58.9 completion percentage his senior year in high school. But Franks also averaged 12.0 yards per attempt and so was much more adept at making big plays compared to his first season as Gators QB (6.3 yards per attempt).
So the question is, are the 2017 struggles on McElwain/Nussmeier or on Franks? And does that provide hope for Franks as a starter under new head coach Dan Mullen in 2018?
To try and answer that question, what follows is my analysis of Franks from the 2017 film. I’m not sure there’s a definitive answer to the questions above, but I do think it gives a clearer idea of how Franks executed what he was asked to do.
Where Franks excels
The two 2017 games that I pulled film from were the games against Vanderbilt and Texas A&M. I chose these because they were Franks best and worst games while McElwain was still in charge. I don’t think it’s fair to judge Franks on the games against Georgia and FSU when even some guys on the team were expressing doubt that their teammates were giving full effort.
It shouldn’t be a surprise that Franks excels in areas that utilize his arm strength. This manifests itself in two ways.
First, he is excellent at throwing deep. When his offensive line gives him protection and he has the time to deliver the ball, he can be very effective. On the above play, you can see that the safeties are not parallel to each other. This usually indicates that only one safety will be deep.
Because Cleveland is on the side of the field opposite to the deep safety, this throw only works if Franks can throw it up the field enough so that safety can’t get involved to break up the play. Because the ball is delivered on-time, that’s exactly what happens. From the pre-snap alignment, this was supposed to be double coverage deep. But because of Franks arm, it ends up being a 1-on-1 situation.
This wasn’t just a one-time thing either. I already mentioned the opening throw against Michigan and the game-winner versus Tennessee. But even when the ball wasn’t completed, Franks showed an ability to get the ball down the field.
On this play, Texas A&M has eight men in the box. The play call is perfect for this alignment, as wide receiver Brandon Powell comes in motion to the bottom of the screen and tight end DeAndre Goolsby follows right behind him. What you can’t see on the TV broadcast – but is critical to the concept – is wide receiver Josh Hammond at the bottom of the screen.
Hammond runs a go-route and Powell runs a deep post. Franks read is simple. If two defenders follow Hammond, he throws to Powell. If two defenders follow Powell, he throws to Hammond. The ball isn’t thrown perfectly and is a really difficult try, but it does hit Hammond in the hands.
Taking deep shots against 1-on-1 coverage is one way to utilize Franks’ strengths. It also minimizes some of his issues with accuracy, as he just needs to put enough air under the ball to allow his receiver to adjust. These are the types of chances Florida will need to take with Franks at the helm.
The other area where Franks really excels is on routes that break to the outside.
On this play, Franks identifies 1-on-1 coverage versus Brandon Powell pre-snap. He then delivers the ball perfectly on-time with perfect placement. This is an NFL throw, as it comes from the opposite hash and is an absolute rope. This isn’t a throw a lot of QBs can make and it’s part of why Dan Mullen has compared Franks’ arm strength to Cam Newton.
This is especially deadly on third down. There’s just no way for the defensive backs to defend the two-man route shown above. The minute Dre Massey cuts in front of A&M defensive back Antonio Howard (#18), Powell has enough room to break to the outside and Franks is able to deliver the ball for the first down.
You’ve also probably heard a lot about Franks locking on to his primary receiver. I saw a little bit of that, but not as much as I thought I would.
On the above play, Franks is waiting for the crossing route to tight end C’yontai Lewis (#80) to clear. But A&M’s linebackers switch between Lewis and DeAndre Goolsby (#30). Franks’ second read looks like the slot receiver to the top of the screen, but he’s bracketed by a linebacker underneath and a safety deep.
Now, you could say he needs to make the throw to that slot receiver. But this concept depends on him being able to throw a touch pass above the linebacker and in front of the safety. Put too much on the throw and it’s an easy interception.
Instead, Franks finds his third option (Goolsby) and scrambles until he can fit the ball in. This play is run correctly. It just isn’t a very good play call for Franks’ strengths.
Where Franks struggles
The idea that Franks locks onto his first read is not entirely correct. Did he do this sometimes? Sure he did. But I don’t believe that was his main issue. Instead, I think his main issue was one of confidence.
If we take the A&M game as an example, you don’t have to look any further than this interception.
The broadcasters got up in arms about a wide open C’yontai Lewis streaking down the field off-screen on the other side of the field. But you can’t blame the QB for that, as he had already been flushed from the pocket. His options were to throw the ball away or give his receiver a chance.
Note that the throw gave Hammond a chance again and was taken away by A&M DB Christian Kirk. At some point, your receivers have to make a play for you. And let’s be honest, 95 percent of the time this is a harmless incompletion on first down. I think it was a worthwhile shot for Franks to take.
This kind of play is also something Franks has felt comfortable doing in the past.
The above play is from one of Franks’ highlight tapes. He is flushed from the pocket and throws his receiver open for a touchdown, just as he was trying to do with Hammond.
The issue I have with this play – particularly in the high school tape – is that Franks comes off of his primary receiver way too early. The slot receiver gets knocked off stride, but when he recovers is wide open down the center of the field.
And coming off of his reads too early – not sticking with one read too long – is what I think the tape says was Franks’ biggest issue in 2017.
On this play, Toney (top of the screen) is the primary read. Franks bails from the pocket and scrambles before Toney even comes out of his break. Even after the play breaks down, Toney is open coming across the field and Franks doesn’t deliver the ball. He then is forced to throw it away.
This happens repeatedly, either in the form of leaving the pocket before the route can develop or by not trusting the initial read before the snap.
For example, on this play Franks double clutches. But his read is Powell on a slant, and Powell is open. The Gators offense was bailed out by a pass interference call on this play, but Franks hesitation closed a window that was already small.
On this play, Franks read is again the slant. This time, he sees the linebacker creeping into the throwing lane and pulls the ball down. But by that time, A&M has been able to break past the Florida offensive line, resulting in a sack.
The same thing happens on this play. The corner comes on the blitz and Franks sees it. But for some reason he double clutches before making the throw. By that time, the safety has been able to recover and breaks up the pass.
I don’t think it’s a coincidence that before the interception diagrammed above, Franks was 7 for 11 for 77 yards (7.0 yards per attempt) while he was 10 for 15 for 58 yards (3.9 yards per attempt) after. He clearly was afraid of making a mistake after that, and it made him second-guess himself.
The result was he held onto the ball and took sacks rather than risking throws downfield. To open the game he was letting it fly. By the end, he was getting flushed from the pocket by ghost pass rushers, sometimes before his first read developed.
Overall, Franks did a good job of understanding where to go with the ball if his pre-snap read stayed in place. But he didn’t adjust if the defense made changes after the snap.
This was a play that really riled up Gators fans. I actually understand what Franks was doing here. His initial read was that it was cover-2 (the safeties were aligned parallel to each other). That means that the outside throw to Hammond is 1-on-1 coverage (albeit with the corner knowing he has deep help from the safety). Add that Franks is clearly comfortable with that kind of throw and it makes sense he would throw it that way.
But what he missed was that after the snap, the safety towards the bottom of the screen dropped down, indicating there was only one deep safety. Because that safety was on the other side of the field from the go route that was being run by Brandon Powell, Powell was wide open. This is the same concept from the first deep throw in the previous section, just that the defensive alignment occurred after the snap rather than before.
This isn’t a misread. Franks still threw the ball to a receiver who had a 1-on-1 matchup. The timing was terrible, but that’s a different issue.
Still, it’s hard to overlook that he completely ignored and/or missed the shift of the safeties after the snap. That shift told him there was a big play available had he been able to read it quickly enough.
Takeaway
After breaking down the film, it is clear that irrespective of Franks designation as a “pro-style QB”, he was a bad fit for what McElwain and Nussmeier wanted to do. They needed someone with pinpoint accuracy who could deliver the ball on-time and on-target repeatedly on short to intermediate routes. That isn’t Feleipe Franks.
But the suggestion that Franks “doesn’t have the mental ability” to play QB, as I’ve seen suggested on Twitter, just doesn’t ring true. He generally knew where to go with the ball before the snap. I just don’t think his coaches put him in a position to succeed.
I don’t think Dan Mullen is going to have that problem. One of the hallmarks of Mullen’s offenses is that it simplifies the decision making process for the QB. That will serve Franks well as he battles to be the starter.
And while I believe completion percentage to be a really important metric for predicting QB play, it’s worth noting that in his 9 years at Mississippi State, Mullen only had a QB top 60 percent twice (Prescott in 2014 and 2015). Prescott also improved from 58.5 percent in year 1 to 66.2 percent in year 3.
Of course, the two years that Prescott exceeded the 60 percent mark are the only years that Mullen’s offenses broke the top-40 in yards per play (16th in 2014 and 35th in 2015). Franks will have to improve his accuracy considerably if the Gators offense is going to be elite with him in charge.
But after three years of the McElwain regime, elite isn’t even really necessary. Competent would be a considerable upgrade, and all of Mullen’s offenses qualified at least as that at Mississippi State. He took over an offense that ranked 110th in yards per play and improved it to 66th in year 1 and then averaged 52nd in his time with the Bulldogs.
You don’t accomplish that if you can’t adjust to your QB personnel. And the adjustment he’s going to need to make with Franks is to focus on what he does well and emphasize those skills.
If Franks is the starter, the Gators need to throw deep a lot. They need to throw outside a lot. They need to minimize short throws where the receiver needs to be hit in-stride and eliminate throws that require a ton of touch. They need to have Franks maintain the threat of being a runner. Even if he isn’t being used in that capacity a ton, he has to keep the defense honest.
But more than anything, they have to give him the freedom to make mistakes. What I see when I look at the film is a QB who is hesitating to let it go.
I don’t know what McElwain and Nussmeier were telling him, but he played way more relaxed against Vanderbilt (coming into the game behind 14-17 after Del Rio’s injury) than he did starting against Texas A&M. You can talk about scheme and reading defenses all you want, but if a QB doesn’t trust his instincts, the ball is always going to be late.
That shouldn’t be a problem with Mullen. If Franks is in there, he’s going to be expected to let loose. And the ability to make big plays is there. With a few tweaks to an offense that plays to his strengths, Franks could become a really good player.
Consider that from 2000-2018, there have been 9 QBs (18.9%) drafted in the first round who had a QB rating below 120 in their first college season where they got significant playing time. Those players? Brady Quinn, Kyle Boller, J.P. Losman, Jay Cutler, Josh Freeman, Matthew Stafford, Christian Ponder, Jake Locker and Paxton Lynch.
That isn’t to say Franks will be one of them. But it means that giving up on him after one year – particularly with the shortcomings of the previous staff – is premature. And none of that takes into account intangibles.
All of the chatter coming out of the program right now points towards Franks having the ability to galvanize the players and as the hardest worker on the team. His teammates clearly haven’t given up on him, and they see the work he’s putting in. That leadership and buy-in means something, particularly with a coaching transition underway.
Now it’s just up to Mullen to take advantage.