Florida has the reputation for being Defensive Back University (DBU). That reputation is well earned.
The Gators have churned out NFL-quality defensive backs for years. Keiwan Ratliffe, Lito Shepherd, Joe Haden, Reggie Nelson, Vernon Hargreaves III, Keanu Neal, Marcus Maye, Teez Tabor, Quincy Wilson and more have patrolled the Swamp through multiple eras of coaches.
Last season appeared to be more of the same as true freshmen C.J. Henderson and Marco Wilson took over at defensive back. With Duke Dawson playing the nickel position, it appeared that Florida had a strong case to continue the DBU claim.
And on the surface, that appeared to be true. The Gators’ opponents averaged only 195 yards per game through the air on a 54.8 percent completion rate.
None of those numbers jump out as particularly poor. In fact, you might look at them and think that they look pretty good. The problem is that viewed through the lens of a per attempt basis, the Gators pass defense rated significantly worse.
Florida ranked 105th in the country against FBS opponents with 8.0 yards per pass attempt. In the previous four seasons, the defense averaged a yards per pass ranking of 15th. The worst in that time-span was 27th in the 4-8 2013 season.
And it turns out, that particular stat is really important.
What stats correlate with scoring?
If you listen to pundits long enough, you might come away with the impression that converting third downs and in the red zone is the key to effective offense. It sounds good. After all, if you can keep drives going and can convert when you get down into scoring territory, you should put up lots of points, right?
Except it isn’t true when you actually look at the numbers.
Third down and red zone conversion percentages versus points per game for 2017 FBS teams. (Will Miles/Read and Reaction)
The above chart shows third down and red zone conversion percentage versus points scored against FBS opponents. There is a slight positive correlation between both, but there is a lot of scatter in the data and the slopes are relatively flat.
What this tells us is that it is not uncommon for teams to be bad in the red zone but score a lot of points. Likewise it is not unusual for teams to be great in the red zone and score sparingly. Even if you account for the number of times a team gets there, red zone scoring doesn’t give the best correlation to scoring.
Instead, it turns out that the statistic that does correlate really well is the number of yards gained per play.
Yards per play versus points per game for 2017 FBS teams. (Will Miles/Read and Reaction)
The above chart shows yards per play plotted against points per game in 2017 for both offenses and defenses against FBS opponents. There is a clear correlation between the two variables. This indicates that scoring is dependent upon big plays, as those have the biggest impact on yards per play. If you run the data for previous years, the same trend is visible.
This makes sense when you really stop and think about it. If you hit a ton of big plays, it doesn’t matter what your red zone or third down percentages are. You’re going to score. Conversely, you can convert 75 percent of your third downs and never get past midfield on a 12-play drive if you get three first downs on 30 yards and then punt after the fourth set of downs.
Applying this data to Florida
This data is interesting because it allows us to predict how an additional yard or two given up by a particular unit should correlate to scoring.
This is critical to understanding Florida’s 2017 season because while the offense was terrible again, the Gators won the SEC East in 2015 and 2016 with almost the exact same numbers. The Gators averaged 23.2, 23.9 and 22.1 points per game from 2015-2017. The offense averaged 4.9, 5.0 and 4.9 yards per play in that same time-span. The offense was essentially unchanged.
This isn’t making an excuse for the offense. It was dreadful and the inability of McElwain and Nussmeier to adjust to their personnel was incredibly frustrating. But it wasn’t the driving reason that the Gators record changed from 9-4 to 4-7.
Florida was basically average on kickoff returns (21.3 yards per return vs. a 21.2 average for FBS teams). The Gators excelled in the punting game, averaging a net of 41.2 yards on 64 kicks compared to a national average of 38.3. The Gators only missed one field goal attempt and two PATs.
There were just two places where the Gators really came up short. The first was penalties. The Gators finished the season ranked 129th (out of 130 teams) in penalties per play and 93rd in penalty yards per game (58.7). Florida’s opponents only averaged 45.5 penalty yards per game.
That equates to a net loss of 0.10 yards per play or about 1.1 points per game based on the equation shown in the chart above. Those 1.1 points would have been really useful against LSU and Texas A&M last season. Except in those games, the Gators had the exact same penalty yardage as its opponents (46 for both Texas A&M and LSU and 44 and 48 for Florida).
That only leaves one place left to look. In 2016, the Gators defense gave up 4.5 yards per play. In 2017, that increased to 5.5. Using the same equation predicts that the Gators would have seen an increase from 16.6 points allowed per game in 2016 to 27.5 in 2017. The actual numbers for 2016 and 2017 were 16.8 and 27.3, respectively.
The run defense was slightly worse, giving up 4.2 yards per rush versus 3.8 the year prior. But the pass defense gave up 8.0 yards per pass compared to 5.9 in 2016.
So while opponents didn’t throw on the Gators defense that often (24.5 attempts per game), those attempts were incredibly efficient. That explains how the defense could give up only 83 yards rushing and seven completions to Texas A&M and still give up 19 points.
Film Study
When I first saw these numbers, I assumed that it was because of the games against Georgia and Missouri skewing the results or because of linebackers who kept getting burned in coverage.
But the Gators averaged 6.2 yards per pass attempt from 2013-2016. In 2017, the Gators defense gave up a higher average that that to every opponent it faced except for Florida State (6.1 yards per attempt). Yes, the Missouri (10.9) and Georgia (14.4) games were particularly bad. But even if you remove those two games, the Gators still gave up 7.7 yards per attempt, including surrendering 8.9 yards per attempt against UAB.
So surely the linebackers are the ones at fault then, right? The image I have in my mind is Kentucky’s tight ends beating linebacker Christian Garcia down the seam or Tennessee’s John Kelly catching balls out of the backfield in one-on-one coverage against a linebacker.
Certainly the linebackers have some culpability, but they were far from the only culprit. The defensive backs also struggled – particularly in one-on-one coverage – just as the stats would suggest.
On this play, the two defensive backs at the top of the screen – Duke Dawson on the slot receiver, C.J. Henderson on the outside – miscommunicate regarding their responsibilities. The result is an easy pitch-and-catch and a play that goes for 40 yards.
On this play, Jeawon Taylor is in press coverage, gets beat off the line of scrimmage and the safety can’t get over in time. This completion is on Taylor as the safety has deep center responsibilities based on the coverage.
The same thing happens to C.J. Henderson here against Missouri. He’s in one-on-one coverage on the outside, gets beat off the line and it’s an easy completion.
The same thing happened to Marco Wilson later in the game. It’s the exact same release from the receiver who is in one-on-one coverage on the outside, and again it’s an easy completion.
Defensive Coaching
Randy Shannon – the Gators defensive coordinator last season – likes to play two-deep coverage to give safety support to his corners to avoid exposing them in one-on-one coverage.
But he had to shift to a one-deep safety look against LSU (and pretty much from then on) to protect the linebackers in coverage and to bring an extra safety into the box in run support. The result was a ton of one-on-one coverage for the young DBs and the subsequent struggles.
One silver lining is that the young DBs were likely not drilled extensively on technique for press coverage, as Shannon doesn’t typically play that type of defense. I doubt they spent much time in spring or fall camp emphasizing the finer points of how to jam a receiver coming off the line.
Compare the play from 2017 to that of 2016. On the play above, the Gators are also in a one-deep safety look with the corners in press coverage. You can see that Quincy Wilson (bottom of the screen) immediately gets his hands on the Missouri receiver. Both of the corners up at the top turn and run with the receivers instead of getting beat right off the line. Neither of those things happened in any of the plays from 2017 I showed above.
Now certainly Missouri’s offense was better in 2017 than 2016. But re-watching both games, I was struck by how often Missouri targeted the Florida DBs deep down the field and how rarely they dared to do that same thing in 2016. They clearly saw on film the same thing that I’m showing. Wilson, Henderson and the other DBs really struggled in one-on-one coverage.
And that leads us to Todd Grantham, the defensive coordinator in 2018. Grantham has a reputation for blitzing a lot. When you blitz you end up leaving your corners on an island. Based on last year’s statistics and film, that may be an issue.
You can see that in his statistics as defensive coordinator. When he gets to the QB, his pass defenses are good. When he doesn’t, the defenses really struggle.
Tackles for loss as a percentage of total tackles, sacks as a percentage of total tackles and yards per pass attempt for Todd Grantham’s defenses and Florida from 2015-2017. (Will Miles/Read and Reaction)
The above chart shows tackles for loss as a percentage of total tackles, sacks as a percentage of total tackles and yards per pass attempt allowed. In his time at Georgia, Grantham only had one good pass defense, and it correlated with getting into the backfield. At Louisville, his pass defenses were all pretty good (averaged 6.5 yards per attempt, typically ranked 20-30 nationally) and his front-sevens were getting into the backfield.
But it doesn’t appear that his corners have a huge impact on the quality of the pass defense. Georgia’s Bacarri Rambo, Brandon Boykin and Sanders Commings were all drafted into the NFL yet struggled for much of their time under Grantham.
Conversely, Florida’s front-seven has not been as dominant recently. A lot of this can be traced back to recruiting, but whatever you want to cite as the reason, the Gators actually were in the backfield less in 2016 than in 2017. This does actually point to the DBU moniker in that the defensive backs (and to some degree, linebackers Jarrad Davis and Alex Anzalone) in 2015 and 2016 were able to cover up for some of the shortcomings on the defensive line.
Takeaway
But this also says something about the defensive backs last season. Wilson and Henderson have lots of physical tools. But anointing them as lock-down corners just isn’t wise, at least not yet. They will certainly get better after playing as true freshmen, and the hope is that they will be taught proper technique with a much-improved strength and conditioning program.
Certainly there are mitigating circumstances. As mentioned, Henderson and Wilson were both true freshmen who were thrust into positions vacated by Quincy Wilson and Teez Tabor, two elite CBs.
Nick Washington spent much of the year hurt, forcing Chauncey Gardner-Johnson into a run-stopping position rather than his preferred role as a centerfielder. And with Washington out, that meant major playing time for true freshmen safeties Brad Stewart and Shawn Davis.
And all defensive units rely on the other units to do their job. Linebacker David Reese and safety Chauncey Gardner-Johnson were two of the top four defenders in tackles for loss. You’d rather see that stat populated with defensive linemen, especially in Shannon’s scheme. With Jordan Sherit and Jachai Polite injured late in the season, it became harder for the defensive backfield to hold up.
But that defensive backfield struggled all season. And while you might blame the offense for leaving the defense on the field, Florida’s time of possession in 2017 was only 10 seconds per game less than in 2016.
The reality is that the secondary is going to have to be much better in 2018 for the Gators defense to improve significantly. That isn’t all on them though. Relying on true freshmen to win in one-on-one coverage consistently is a recipe for disaster, no matter how good they are.
And many of the same things could have been said about the Gators defense coming into 2008. The 2007 defense surrendered 7.2 yards per attempt after the 2006 National Championship defense surrendered just 5.7. That 2007 defense had sophomore Markihe Anderson and true freshmen Major Wright and Joe Haden as defensive backs, a similar situation to Henderson, Wilson and Gardner-Johnson to start 2017.
In 2008, the defense was back to allowing 5.5 yards per attempt with a dominant secondary. So perhaps we’ll be watching Shawn Davis deliver a hit like Major Wright in a playoff game come January.
But just as I’ve warned that Feleipe Franks isn’t going to become an All American just because of Dan Mullen’s arrival, I think the same warning may need to apply to the defensive backs under Grantham.
The good news is that jettisoning Shannon’s scheme and another year of experience should help significantly.