The Mullen Effect: How the new Gators coach supercharged the offense after years of futility

In my 2018 season preview, I posted this figure (based on 2012-2016 data against FBS opponents) to examine how many spots offenses that rank in the 100s (in yards per play) in one season typically improve in the next season.

The good news was that offenses that bad typically improved, at least some. The bad news was that Florida’s offenses ranked 89th in 2010, 76th in 2011, 95th in 2012, 108th in 2013, 94th in 2014, 102nd in 2015, 100th in 2016 and 104th in 2017. Dan Mullen clearly had some work to do.

Mullen took over a similar situation at Mississippi State. The Bulldogs offense had ranked 117th overall in yards per play in 2008 (and 104th and 119th in 2006 and 2007), but improved to 66th in 2009 under Mullen, an improvement of 51 spots in the rankings.

Mullen has now repeated the feat at Florida. The Gators currently sit at 44th in yards per play, an improvement of 60 spots in the rankings.

Even if they were to struggle in the bowl game, they’ll end up at least 50 spots better in the rankings. Of all teams from 2012-2016 with offenses ranked in the 100s, only 19 percent of them have seen an increase as much.

Mullen has now done it twice.

The question is, how has he done it? What changed so significantly between 2017 and 2018 that Florida was finally able to bury its offensive woes? And perhaps more importantly, what does that suggest about the future of the Florida offense in 2019 and beyond?

The Running Game

As much as we might want to focus solely on the improvement of QB Feleipe Franks (and we’ll get to that), a big part of the reason Florida’s offense has been so much better is rooted in the running game.

The Gators were a middle-of-the-road team on the ground in 2017, averaging 4.3 yards per rush against FBS opponents (ranked 63rd nationally). This season, the Gators ranked 24th at 5.1 yards per rush. What this means is that if – on average – the Gators ran the ball twice with an incompletion in between, Florida achieved a first down in 2018 but punted in 2017.

One of the biggest areas for improvement in 2018 was the running of Feleipe Franks. While his 2.9 yards per rush don’t blow you away – especially when compared to 6.1 yards per rush for Nick Fitzgerald under Mullen in 2017 – but it is 2.6  yards per rush more than his average in 2017.

This became a huge part of the offense later in the season as Franks was able to help Florida take advantage of the numbers advantage up-front.

On this play, Florida has an advantage up-front based on numbers. Additionally, South Carolina only has four defenders inside the first down marker. That means that this is an automatic first down because Franks is a willing runner. The fact that he is able to break a tackle and turn it into a TD is a significant bonus, but just having this in the playbook keeps the chains moving, critical in the red zone when your passing game is not fantastic.

That willingness has other effects too. Here’s a play from 2017 in Jim McElwain’s offense against Tennessee.

Watch the defensive end on the top side of Tennessee’s defense. He just crashes down the line of scrimmage and pays zero attention to Franks. That’s because in the McElwain offense, the QB never pulls the ball and runs. While the corner on the blitz makes the tackle on this play, had he not been blitzing the running back was going to be wrapped up short of the first down by the defensive end.

In Mullen’s offense, the QB run is always a threat. The result is that that same defensive end pays a price for crashing in on the running back.

Here, Florida State defensive end Brian Burns (#99) crashes down to stop running back Lamical Perine (#22). When Franks sees Burns crash, he immediately pulls the ball and runs around the end for a first down. This doesn’t just gain Florida yards from time to time. The threat of Franks running eases the burden on the offensive line by essentially allowing Franks to “block” the defensive end.

That just wasn’t the case in 2017. Often you’ll hear analysts say that the main job of a QB who is a “game manager” – and this was definitely true in McElwain’s offense – is to get his team in the right play. Franks does not do that here.

You can see that from the start, as Michigan has 10 men up at the line of scrimmage on a third-and-4. Franks needed to check into something else here. Whether it was a pass play or a run to the wide side of the field (because Michigan was overloading the boundary side of the field) didn’t really matter.

The problem is that McElwain didn’t allow Franks to make those kinds of checks. Whether he was allowed and not capable or not allowed is something we can’t know, but we do know it didn’t occur.

Conversely, Mullen’s offense puts that decision in Franks’ hands post-snap because the Gators offense now has multiple options off of similar formations. This is the same drive as the read-option play where Burns crashed shown above. This play – out of the same exact formation against a very similar defense – hinges on Franks’ decision making.

First, let’s note that Florida State actually has Florida outnumbered up-front (just like Michigan did in the example above). But what Franks sees post-snap is Burns (#99) holding his position rather than crashing. But also note that FSU linebacker Jaiden Woodbey (#20) also holds his position because of the threat of Franks running the ball.

Those two defenders holding their position immediately gives Florida an advantage at the point of attack. This is what I mean by allowing the QB to “block” defenders and help the offensive line. The result has been a major uptick in offensive line play.

Running backs Lamical Perine (128 rush, 750 yards) and Jordan Scarlett (122 rush, 717 yards) both have played really well this season. But much of that improvement can be tied directly to the offensive line.

Football Outsiders tracks six different advanced metrics for offensive lines in the running game. Florida’s FBS rank improved in 2018 in every single category in the running game.

I’m not going to spend a whole lot of time going into detail regarding what each of these numbers mean. Suffice it to say that if you improve in every single metric, it’s indicative of an offensive line that is greatly improved.

Coach John Hevesy has done a great job taking basically the same offensive line as last season, just with Nick Buchanan substituted for T.J. McCoy at center. But a lot of this is scheme. It is allowing Franks to be a willing runner. It is taking advantage of numbers advantages up-front. It is generating a numbers advantage by using the threat of Franks pulling the ball.

When Mullen took over Mississippi State, the Bulldogs saw an increase from 2.8 to 4.9 yards per rush against FBS opponents from 2008 to 2009. He worked his magic again this year with Florida. Coaching clearly matters.

The Passing Game

Of course, if we’re going to talk about the Mullen effect, we clearly have to look at the passing game.

But the first place to look is again the offensive line. Again if we look at Football Outsiders stats – this time three advanced metrics – Florida improved in all three categories.

But the line didn’t just improve a few slots like it did in the running game. The offensive line improved massively. This was really due to an increase in trust all across the line, but also with the running backs.

On this play, Jordan Scarlett – who struggled in pass protection in 2016 – is responsible to block defensive end Kyle Phillips (#5). He absolutely stones him while also carrying out the play fake. For Franks to stand in the pocket requires that he trust that Scarlett will do his job in pass protection. The fact that Scarlett rewarded that trust is why Florida was able to score on this play.

Franks did not have that level of trust in 2017 and it severely limited the Florida offense.

On this play, Kentucky only rushes three defenders. He has a solid pocket to make a throw but scrambles right into the lineman who is spying him. Had he just stayed put, he would have been able to deliver the ball to running back Mark Thompson (#24) or further down the field. And once he decided to leave the pocket, his head was down and he had no shot at finding an open receiver.

While he hasn’t been perfect at this in 2018, Franks has greatly improved at keeping his eyes downfield when there is pressure.

On this play Franks sees his first option covered. He pulls the ball down and looks like he might scramble into a sack. But instead, he takes a step back and hits running back Lamical Perine to set up second-and short.

All of the things that have improved this year came together on this play. First, Scarlett picks up the blitzing corner. Then Franks steps up in the pocket and instead of running keeps his head up and delivers an accurate throw to tight end C’yontai Lewis.

Franks wasn’t accurate in 2017 and only completed 54.6 percent of his throws. That increased to 58.5 percent and some of that is due to improved mechanics, footwork, etc. But much of it is due to scheme.

This play is from 2017. This type of screen was a staple in Dan Mullen’s offense this year as well. But note that Franks has to throw the ball from the bottom hash marks to Brandon Powell when Powell is almost out at the numbers. That’s a pretty long throw and Franks throws the ball slightly behind Powell slowing him down.

This screen is to also to the wide side of the field. However, because of the way Mullen has designed the play, Franks only has to throw the ball from one hash to the other. The result is a much easier throw and Franks hits Josh Hammond in stride, allowing him to gain the first down.

The last piece of the passing game improvement is that Franks is improving, and significantly so. Last season, he would lead defenders directly towards where he wanted to go with the ball.

This play is a slant with a three-step drop. The Texas A&M middle linebacker follows Franks’ eyes and immediately drifts into the throwing lane. Look at the inside receiver at the top of the screen (Brandon Powell, #4). He shakes the defensive back out of his shoes and is wide open, but Franks can’t let the ball go because the linebacker is in the way.

This is a very similar play against a very similar defense. Note first that Franks is throwing the slant to the wide receiver to the boundary. This is a short throw, thus allowing him to be more accurate.

Second, see how Franks immediately looks to his left. This is window dressing. He knows where he’s going with the ball before it is snapped. Because the Florida State cornerback (Stanford Samuels, #8) is playing press coverage, Franks knows he has one-on-one coverage. Instead, Franks looks left to move middle linebacker Leonard Warner (#35).

Warner’s first step is to his right, opening up the slant. Franks completes the easy throw for a big third-down conversion.

On this play from 2017 (a second-and-5), the corner at the bottom of the screen blitzes, leaving Kadarius Toney on a safety one-on-one. The weakside linebacker chases after running back Malik Davis into the flat, meaning there is nobody in Franks’ throwing lane. Franks’ throw isn’t terrible, but it leads Toney directly into the safety. Had he put it out just a little bit more in front, perhaps the play could have gone for a longer gain.

On this play, Franks hits wide receiver Trevon Grimes right in stride, allowing him to make a big gain. But also note that this is a run-pass option. The threat of the run brings up the Florida State safety, turning this into a much easier throw.

The final piece is the QB running game. We already saw above how Franks’ ability and willingness to run made things easier for his offensive line. But it also makes things easier for him.

Note the small jab step that he takes to his left to open up this play. This brings the safety at the top of the screen up and ensures that he will have one-on-one coverage on all three of his receivers. At that point, it’s on Van Jefferson to beat a safety and he does so easily.

Takeaway

And that is the theme when you watch Mullen’s offense over the entire year. Easy.

Franks was far from perfect in 2018. But he had easier options. Even in the Missouri game, there were plays that were open and Franks just wasn’t able to deliver the ball accurately. But one thing that became apparent in that game – and Mullen corrected in the next game against South Carolina – was that Franks needed to be more of a threat in the running game.

It’s not a coincidence that Franks had as many rushing attempts against South Carolina and Florida State as he did against Missouri, Georgia, Vanderbilt and LSU combined. Once that became a true threat, the offense opened up and allowed for plays that were easier to execute.

The throw above to Toney against Kentucky was hard. Maybe Franks could have led him a little bit, but Kentucky can’t play that defense if the QB run is a significant threat. That same threat of a run opened up the play to Jefferson for the TD.

This isn’t a coincidence. Mullen knows what he’s doing.

I underestimated his impact coming into the year. I thought he’d improve the offense, but didn’t think he would have this kind of an impact.

After he was hired, he spoke often about putting his players into positions to succeed. The film shows that he didn’t just do that for the QB, but for the running backs, wide receivers and offensive line as well.

But we can’t ignore what he did with the QB. Franks went from 111th in the country in passer rating (113.3) to 45th (144.1). It probably shouldn’t be a surprise that that improvement in ranking (66 spots) closely mirrors Florida’s improvement on offense overall (60 spots).

The question for a later time is where does Franks – and this offense – go from here. But for now, I think it’s appropriate to just take a step back and appreciate what Mullen has accomplished. He knew that his job was to bring back efficiency, fun and points to the Florida offense.

There’s still a bowl game to go, but regardless of the outcome of that game, the 2018 season has been a job well done.