Lots of people would point to Feleipe Franks as the reason that Florida’s offense was so much better last season.
In many ways, they are right. Franks went from a well below average QB to a slightly above average one. The Florida passing game averaged a full yard per attempt more. But that only raised the Florida passing game to 71st in the country (up from 107th). Had the Florida running game been average – as it was in 2017 (ranked 63rd in yards per rush) – the Gators would have had a below average offense.
Instead, the Gators offense ranked 37th in the country in points per game and 32nd in yards per play. For a team that went 3-0 in one-score games and 3-1 against teams with more talent (based on recruiting rankings), the success of the running game is a big reason why.
Just look at the rushing stats in those four games against more talented opponents (LSU, Georgia, Florida State and Michigan).
- Passing: 56-100, 705 yards, 6 TD
- Rushing: 171 rush, 925 yards, 8 TD
The same trend was true in the one-score games as well (Mississippi State, LSU and South Carolina), as the Gators rushed for 700 yards and only passed for 576, with 6 out of 9 TDs coming on the ground.
Florida’s average rank during the Jim McElwain offensive reign of terror from 2015-2017 was 94th in yards per game and 93rd in yards per attempt and they never averaged more than 157 yards per game vs. FBS opponents. Last year under Mullen, the Gators were 22nd in yards per game and 19th in yards per attempt and averaged 215 rushing yards per game.
That’s even more remarkable when you consider that the Gators offensive line and running backs were virtually the same as in 2016 and 2017.
So the question is, what changed?
Offensive Line
When the running game improved, the first place you look is the offensive line. I wrote extensively about this year’s offensive line expectations a couple of weeks ago.
Improvement in the Florida offensive line in the running game under Dan Mullen. (Will Miles/Read and Reaction)
I’ve shown this chart from Football Outsiders before, but I think there are two things worth noting.
First, Football Outsiders defines “Opportunity Rate” as “the percentage of carries (when four yards are available) that gain at least four yards, i.e. the percentage of carries where the line does its job.”
Florida’s offensive line significantly improved (average of 79th to 17th) at doing its job correctly. That points directly to coaching.
The second thing I think is worth noting is the place where Florida’s line did not improve. “Power Success Rate” is “the percentage of runs on third or fourth down, two yards or less to go, that achieved a first down or touchdown.”
So in situations where Florida had to go smashmouth and just run over its opponent, it was unable to do so any better in 2018 than in 2017. This is where the effects of the strength and conditioning program showed. One season likely wasn’t enough to undo the atrophy that set in under McElwain.
So what we had was an offensive line that executed the scheme well but was unable to muscle-up when needed. This year’s line is more inexperienced so you wonder whether they’ll be able to execute as well, but they should be much more equipped to play smashmouth when needed.
Scheme
When your offensive line can execute well, it opens up the staff to do a bunch of different things. Mullen’s scheme is so simple, yet he has multiple actions out of very similar sets. It’s part of what makes his offense so difficult to defend.
This is a pretty standard Florida play. Franks reads Michigan linebacker Chase Winovich (#15) crashing off the edge, pulls the ball and runs for a first down. But this is where scheme overcomes limitations in ability. Florida left tackle Martez Ivey (#72) tried to cut Michigan linebacker Devin Gil (#36) and whiffs on both him and Winovich. But both Gil and Winovich crash inside so hard that Franks is able to get outside.
But the Florida scheme also has a response when the ends/linebackers don’t crash.
On this play, Michigan linebacker Khaleke Hudson (#7) stays home and doesn’t crash. But that also means that he gets caught in traffic and Florida can run the play to the boundary with a numbers advantage. Note Florida right guard Fred Johnson (#74) helping out initially to block Gil (#36) but quickly getting to the second level to engage linebacker Josh Ross (#12).
This seems pretty simple, as Franks just has to read the outermost defender and make a decision to keep the ball of hand off. But if we look at the wide angles of these plays, we can see how Mullen’s scheme dictates what Michigan has to do.
From the first play, we see Florida has three wide receivers at the bottom of the formation. Michigan has three defenders up at the line with a single high safety back deep. So Michigan has to account for Franks with Winovich (#15) unless they are going to help with the safety. But if they help with the safety, then they isolate each of their DBs in one-on-one coverage with zero safety help.
Because Florida doesn’t have a receiver to the top of the formation, Franks is virtually guaranteed that that entire area will be open if he can get around Winovich. Note how Gil (#36) is right up at the line of scrimmage. C’yontai Lewis (#80) appears to try to pin his man (Hudson, #7) inside but Hudson does a good job to force Franks back to the inside, where he is chased down by Gil and the safety (Tyree Kinnel, #23).
On the second play, Florida has two wide receivers at the bottom of the screen but note how wide they are split out. That forces Kinnel (#23) to stay in the middle of the field instead of in-line with Franks. Hudson (#7) plays with much more depth, knowing he is accountable for Franks on the back side. That means Florida has a six blockers for six defenders and Perine is free to run until the safety (Kinnel, #23) gets him.
This is where the “doing your job” part of the offensive line numbers make such a difference. If any of those players gets knocked backwards, it gives Hudson time to get over. If Johnson doesn’t get off his combo block to the second level, Perine gets dragged down by Ross (#12). And if Perine doesn’t hit the hole aggressively, it gives the defense time to recover.
I actually think this is what Mullen is addressing when he talks about Kadarius Toney “freelancing”.
This is a long GIF because what happens pre-snap tells us a lot about the play. Initially Florida had five WR in the formation and motioned Toney in to the right side of Franks. At that point, Florida has five blockers for six defenders, though note that the “linebacker” who motioned in with Toney is actually a defensive back (#22, David Long), giving Florida a size advantage for a run play.
Franks then audibles and Toney motions to Franks’ left. With that, Long realigns to the center of the formation while the other linebacker (Josh Ross, #12) moves outside of Winovich (#15). Franks then is responsible to read Ross (who stays on Franks) so he hands the ball to Toney.
Schematically, this is a touchdown. But center Nick Buchanan (#64) allows his man to get a little bit to his right side and Toney cuts back. That’s a problem because the hole is there and Toney on a safety (circled) isn’t fair. More than anything, you would much rather Toney get tackled for a 2-yard gain by Buchanan’s man while trying to slip through the hole than cutting back in a way that completely blows up the play design.
And ignoring Mullen’s play design is a problem because he can dial up something like this.
This looks like a standard read-option play but it isn’t. It’s a run play designed for Franks.
You can tell because tight end C’yontai Lewis (#80) pulls across the formation and he is the one who reads the Michigan defensive end (Kwity Paye, #19). Paye crashes towards Perine so Lewis continues on to block the strong safety (Kinnel, #23).
I think this was Michigan’s attempt to respond to Florida’s success with the read-option: have both safeties deep at the snap but bring one up to be responsible for Franks while allowing the defensive end to crash. Basically, take the decision of whether to crash or not out of the defensive lineman’s hands.
The problem for the Wolverines is that pulling tight end. Mullen must have seen this on film – or he’s just a really gifted play caller – because he caught Michigan in their adjustment. Franks again was running in an open field, but this time he had a lead blocker against the safety.
Franks struggled in 2018 throwing against zone defenses. And certainly Michigan could have tried a zone. But the problem is when you try to use a zone, you’re at even more of a numbers disadvantage up-front.
Because South Carolina was so beaten up at defensive back, the Gamecocks had to play a ton of zone. Florida knew they’d likely have to do that, and so Mullen clearly came prepared. On this play, because the safeties are deep, Florida has eight blockers for seven defenders.
Mullen talks a lot about player versatility and I think we see it most obviously with defensive backs and linebackers, where either a LB can survive in coverage while being strong against the run or a DB can survive against the run while excelling in coverage. But the same logic applies to wide receivers and blocking.
On the above play, Kadarius Toney (all 5’11”, 190lbs of him, #4) takes on linebacker T.J. Brunson (#6) and drives him 20 yards downfield and pancakes him. That’s obviously important for this play, as it frees up Scarlett to keep running down the field. But it’s also important for the plays coming down the road.
This reverse is out of the same exact formation against a very similar defense. While the first play was Florida overpowering South Carolina, this play is them gaining an advantage through misdirection. That is only possible if Toney can block the first play because otherwise the opposition knows what is coming when he’s on the field.
Takeaway
Dan Mullen’s scheme is designed to put the defense in a no-win situation.
But it requires everyone to do their job. The offensive line has to prevent immediate penetration. The QB (or the TE if the play design is different) has to read the backside defensive end or linebacker correctly. And the running back has to hit the hole quickly in order to maintain the advantage from the scheme.
Each response the defense brings has a counter from Mullen. Basically, if things are run correctly the only right answer is penetration early and often.
Mississippi State and Kentucky excelled last season at getting into the backfield and so it shouldn’t be a surprise Florida struggled against them. Florida’s running game against Georgia was actually quite good. But the Bulldogs sat back in a zone and basically allowed Florida to get first downs counting on the fact that Franks would make mistakes, which he did.
That means that we should look at strong defensive fronts when looking at games where the Florida offense may struggle. The good news is Florida only plays three teams in 2019 who were in the top-50 in tackles for loss in 2018 (Miami, Auburn and Kentucky). The bad news is that Florida will be breaking in a really young offensive line against the team that ranked number one (Miami) who has five of its front-seven returning.
I have no doubt that Mullen will have some added wrinkles for the Hurricanes. He’s too skilled of a coach not to, especially considering that Manny Diaz was the defensive coordinator there last season.
But I do think it means that anyone who overlooks Miami as a difficult opponent is going to be surprised. Florida may win, but the Hurricanes have the personnel to give the Gators some problems up-front.
But the larger point remains that Mullen’s offense, if executed correctly, should be virtually impossible to stop. That’s why the offensive lines at Mississippi State could be consistently good, regardless of star ranking or level of experience.
And it’s why Florida’s running game is going to continue to hum in 2019.