Blocking Progress: Why Billy Napier faces a 12-year offensive line problem at UF

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Editor’s Note: Bill Sikes is a good friend, and someone I lean on when need to bounce ideas off of someone related to Gator football. He’s also a heck of an analyst and someone who helped build Gators Breakdown early on. When he asked me if he could write an article about Florida’s offensive line recruiting, I jumped at the chance. If you’re so inclined, you can reach him at billsikes@ymail.com.

When UF offensive line coach John Hevesy was fired in early November, most Gator fans breathed a momentary sigh of relief. The Dan Mullen problem remained of course, but Hevesy’s dismissal was a sign that the wheels of needed change were turning. More specifically, the move signaled that program administration would demand better management of its offensive line moving forward.

To understand why, consider that Hevesy’s OLs weren’t objectively horrible like the defenses of also-fired coordinator Todd Grantham. While the 2021 offensive line ranked only 115th nationally in Power Success Rate (a measure of short-yardage OL performance), they actually played well in spots. The unit held their own against a talented Alabama front early on and even managed the 5th best sack rate in the nation.

But on the other hand, the cumulative impact of Hevesy’s terrible recruiting had become obvious by this fall. The coach signed only 1 top-100 OL signee since 2018 (Georgia had 10 during the same timeframe) and none of his recruits had become conference-elite players. Relegated instead to “gem mining” for overlooked talent, only a few of his signees have even emerged as quality starters. Perhaps most damning though, is that after 4 years, mediocre transfers with limited upside still occupied multiple starting positions.  Hevesy may have been a good coach from an instructional standpoint, but he clearly didn’t exemplify Billy Napier’s belief that college football is a “talent acquisition business”. Ultimately, that’s what got him fired.

The toughest part of the ordeal for Gator fans is that Hevesy’s failure wasn’t a new problem. Instead, he merely represented the latest chapter in a saga of offensive line futility that spans most of the post-Tebow era. Since then, the unit’s on-field performance has degraded, depth has been a constant headache, and recruiting at the position has looked far more difficult than it should. The decline has been so steep that since 2010, UF and Vanderbilt are the only 2 SEC programs without an AP 1st team All-SEC offensive lineman.

While fans are all too-aware of the position’s on-field struggles, they may not understand why roster mismanagement is largely to blame. It may also come as a surprise to learn how its impact has compounded from year to year, or that the mismanagement first began to emerge when Urban Meyer was still head coach. The fact of the matter is that this isn’t just a John Hevesy or Dan Mullen problem. Instead, the ongoing issues, and the cumulative dysfunction they’ve caused, began in 2010.

As such, OL roster mismanagement now stands as a 12-year-old road block between Billy Napier and the SEC championship. To win in Atlanta, the coach must fix what’s broken and end the position’s long run as a liability to the program. In all likelihood, 4 to 5 years from now, Napier will either be hailed as the one to overcome these issues, or else meet the same fate as his recent predecessors.

With this urgency in mind, I’m writing this article to shed light on 3 distinct areas where things have gone wrong. Harnessing factual evidence, I’ll explore their impact, and provide benchmarks to follow as the new era of Gator football begins. With the bad news out of the way, I’ll explain why Billy Napier may be primed to revive UF’s offensive line in a big way.

Class Size Inconsistency

But first, let’s explore how this debacle began. To do so, we have to go all the way back to early 2010. Gator football rested near the pinnacle of the sport at the time, as it triumphantly basked in the warm glow of 2 recent National Championships. In this environment, it appeared that not even a fresh loss to Alabama in the 2009 SEC title game, nor Urban Meyer’s brief esophageal-spasm-induced retirement could derail the program’s momentum. In fact, when the smoke from this adversity cleared on February 3rd, 2010, UF emerged from National Signing Day with the nation’s #1 recruiting class.

As we know however, things went south from there. Meyer soon left for good, Gator offense flew north for a decade-long winter, and the 2010 class disappointed. Ironically, while the class provided hope for stability at the time of its signing, it now appears to have played a small, but key role in the genesis of Gator football’s decline. For the record though, I’m not merely referring to the group’s oft-criticized tilt toward defensive talent. Instead, I’m specifically talking about the fact that it only included 2 offensive linemen.

You see, since 2010, UF and each of the 4 programs which have won the SEC since (Auburn, LSU, Alabama, and Georgia) have signed between 44 and 51 total offensive linemen over their last 12 recruiting classes. This presents a yearly average of 3.7 OLs per class on the low end (Auburn) and 4.3 per year on the high end (Alabama). With the numbers for these programs (and their 60 total recruiting classes) being so close, it’s pretty clear that they all target around 4 OLs in each class. Some slight variance can still be healthy in a given year, but even consecutive 3-man classes is probably undersigning.

Even so, signing only 2 OLs in 2010 may not seem like that big of a deal. Maybe it’s suboptimal, but every program will inevitably come up short by a recruit or two from time to time. Also, the 2 that Meyer signed that year, Chaz Green and Ian Silberman, were really good prospects. As long as Meyer’s replacement compensated for the misses in the next class, the damage would be minimized.

But that new coach was Will Muschamp and even after all this time, I’m still not entirely convinced that he believed in actually fielding an offense. In 2011, his initial class at UF featured only 2 OLs, just like the year before. Then, things got real. Although Muschamp assembled a #3 overall class the following year, he inexplicably signed only 2 offensive linemen yet again in 2012. For those counting at home, this means that over 3 full roster-building cycles, Gator football added only 6 OL prospects to its roster. Instead of being short by an offensive lineman or 2 after 2010, they were now missing 5 to 6.

In the chaotic aftermath that followed, UF embarked on a rollercoaster ride of repeated class size imbalances at the position. First, Muschamp added a pair of huge OL classes before being fired, signing 12 prospects between 2013 and 2014. Then, Jim McElwain added 5 in 2015, but regressed back to small class sizes of 3 and 2 in the following years. Hevesy and his boss Dan Mullen signed healthy numbers early on, but eventually added a 3-man class in 2021. In total, this means that Urban Meyer and his 3 successors failed to reach the target number of offensive linemen in 6 of the last 12 recruiting classes.

Practically speaking, such class-size inconsistency laid a foundation of demise for several reasons. First, the most obvious, it deprived the position of needed depth on a regular basis. Second, the extreme up-and-down class sizes disrupted the class-year distribution of the OL roster. Rather than developing a conveyor belt where each year featured a similarly-sized veteran core, the class size inconsistency contributed to an over-reliance upon youth in some years. Third, it reduced the margin of error within the 6 undersized classes.  As those groups became veterans, any misevaluations or roster attrition would be costly.

For comparison, here are the OL class sizes of recent SEC champion programs during the same period. You’ll notice that Alabama, Georgia and LSU have each been more consistent than UF, with only 3 of their 36 combined classes featuring fewer than 3 offensive linemen. Auburn on the other hand, signed a whopping 19 OLs in years 2, 3, and 4 prior to its 2013 SEC championship. Since then, their class sizes have routinely fallen short of the target range.

After viewing this data however, I get it if you think I’m overstating the problem. Sure, 3-year stretches of signing only 6 (2010-2012) and 9 (2015-2017) OLs are pretty bad, but Alabama only signed 10 over 3 years from 2010-2012. If that was sufficient to win multiple championships for them, then there has to be more to the story. Unfortunately, there is.

Massive Attrition

In January of 2013, almost 3 years had passed since UF signed their aforementioned #1 class in 2010. Now in their third year on campus, the defensive stars of that group had just played a sizable role in the 2012 team’s 11-2 record. Although the Gator offense wasn’t lighting the world on fire, its defense had become an identity to build around. If Muschamp could walk the proverbial tight rope and survive his early mistakes (including the small OL class sizes of his first 3 years), he might just become UF’s next great head coach. But then, a triple dose of reality arrived which made that task significantly tougher.

On January 16, 2013, UF OL Jessamen Dunker was charged with a felony, which ultimately led to his departure from the team. 2 days later on January 18, news broke that another UF OL, Tommy Jordan, was leaving the program due to a medical issue. Then, less than a year later on December 12, 2013, UF OL Ian Silberman decided to transfer after completing his degree. The news was unfortunate in each case, but it wasn’t exactly unprecedented. Player attrition is typical, even if arrests like Dunker’s aren’t.

The problem though, is that these three players were signed in 2010 (Silberman), 2011 (Jordan), and 2012 (Dunker), leaving UF with only 3 rostered OL signees from those 3 recruiting classes. At that point, an already half-sized recruiting haul from those 3 years had just been cut in half again. UF now had a developing crisis on its hands, but strangely, the pattern of excessive OL attrition was only beginning.

Recall how I mentioned earlier that Will Muschamp signed 12 OL prospects between the 2013 and 2014 classes. The additions weren’t enough to save Muschamp’s job, but they made sense given the need for bodies at the position.  What still doesn’t make any sense at all, is that 9 of those 12 offensive linemen eventually exited UF’s program prematurely for one reason or another. Several had medical issues, some were grad-transfers to other schools, 1 quit football, and 1 transferred out after never seeing the field at UF. As the exodus unfolded, what began as a big problem eventually blossomed into a full-blown positional catastrophe.

By the time head coach Jim McElwain arrived in 2015, the OL numbers had cratered. Attrition had dogpiled on top of class size inconsistency and 5 years later, the team could barely pencil in a starting lineup. The situation was so dire leading up to that year’s spring game, that there were only 6 healthy offensive linemen on scholarship.

McElwain struggled of course, eventually caving under the weight of mass-player-arrests, imaginary death threats, and an inability to generate points on offense. But for the moment, OL attrition subsided, as only 2 of his recruits (Brandon Sandifer & Kadeem Telfort) left the program prematurely. Shortly after Dan Mullen arrived however, the OL attrition Sharknado touched down in Gainesville once again.

By the end of 2019, 2 of Mullen’s 4 OL signees from the 2018 class (Chris Bleich and Noah Banks) had already exited from the program. In the months that followed that, 2 members of the 2019 class failed to qualify for admission (Deyavie Hammond and Wardrick Wilson). Then, 2 more class of 2020 signees decided to transfer (Issiah Wilson and Gerald Mincey).

As of early 2022, that leaves UF’s 2010-2021 OL signee attrition rate at an almost unbelievable 43%. Losing 20 of its 46 signees from classes during that period, this rate is about twice as high as any program which has won the SEC since then. The attrition losses represent every recruiting class during the period except for the 3-man haul in 2016, and so far, 2021.  5 of the 12 classes during that time lost multiple OL prospects, while each of the 4 classes with only 2 signees eventually lost 1.

I understand however, if you’re tempted to blame “bad luck” for some of this, especially as it pertains to UF’s medically related OL attrition. But keep in mind that at least half of the players who left for medical reasons (Jackson, Kelleher, Banks) had preexisting conditions when they arrived at UF. So, allocating class spots to those players (especially when you already have a headcount problem) represented a calculated risk. Moreover, UF led those other 4 programs in total transfers and grad transfers, as well as medical departures. Leading in any one of those categories might reasonably be explained away as a tough break. But leading in all of them is a likely sign of bad management.

For some reason, UF’s recent staffs didn’t seem to understand that there is more to evaluating an offensive lineman than grading flexibility and strength. Those things do matter, but so does a prospect’s health, grades, and their potential fit within the Gator program. Or, in the case of 2019 signee Wardrick Wilson, whether they can even legally enter the United States to play college football. Unfortunately, recent Gator coaches have done a bad job with these evaluations and that’s part of what has fueled the crippling attrition.

Poor Recruiting

There was however, one thing those staffs could’ve done to help themselves as they tried to dig their way out. By consistently signing top-rated prospects, they would’ve provided the program with players who produce at a much higher rate than their unheralded counterparts. Doing so would not have nullified depth concerns, nor would it have provided a magic fix. But, when you don’t sign enough (or retain enough) prospects, it becomes even more important to recruit those with the best odds of becoming great players.

Since the class of 2010 for example, UF OL recruits ranked in the top-10 at their respective positions have become full-season starters 75% of the time (starting 10+ games in at least one season). But those ranked lower (outside the positional top-10) only did so 22% of the time. While top-10 OLs have started an average of 23 total games in their UF careers, those ranked outside the top-10 have only started an average of 7. So, it’s clear that highly-ranked prospects have not only been better at UF, but they’ve contributed over 3 times as much per man as their lower-ranked classmates.

That’s one reason it’s so bad that UF only signed 8 top-10 OL prospects since 2010. During the same period, Alabama signed 26, Georgia signed 22, LSU signed 14, and Auburn signed 13. Making matters much worse, 4 of UF’s 8 were added in the 3 classes from 2010-2012. That means UF has only added 4 top-10 OLs to its rosters over the past 9 recruiting classes.

What they have added in large quantity is OL prospects ranked lower than 500 overall in the 247 Composite. With 20 such recruits since 2010, they’ve far-outpaced any program which has won the SEC since then. During that time, those recent championship programs added only 4 to 13 each. While UF did find a few hidden gems in this range (including 2nd round draft pick Jawaan Taylor), 10 of the 20 never started a game for the program (but this does include a few players still on the roster). It’s not that they’re all bad, they just aren’t great very often.

While UF’s inability to consistently land top OL talent seemed to accelerate throughout the period, it appeared to reach its zenith under the watch of John Hevesy. Since he arrived in 2018, only 2 national top-250 prospects were added to the OL in 4 years. But the highest-ranked of those (Richard Gouraige) was already committed to the program when Hevesy arrived. The other (Issiah Walker) barely set down his luggage before transferring to Miami.

Over the past few years, Hevesy’s abrasive personality and his ineffective pitch became the wrong kind of legendary in Gainesville. Rather than an inviting presence on the Gator staff, he essentially became a form of talent repellant in which top recruits had little interest. Things got so bad this fall that he even lost a head-to-head recruiting battle against UCF for 3-star prospect Leyton Nelson. Known to be a recruiting liability since the Urban Meyer days, the fact that he was even hired to fix this mess is perhaps as scandalous as it is typifying of the culture that allowed it.

Napier off the top rope???

But alas, that clown show is over. Enter Billy Napier, the man who could be primed to turn this all around in a big way. That’s no certainty of course, but it’s not blind optimism either. Instead, there are at least 3 tangible reasons to believe he’s got the chops to get this done. So FINALLY, let’s talk about some good news:

Reason for optimism #1 – Staff enhancement – First, let’s talk about how to logically improve class size consistency and reduce attrition. If you think about it, this essentially requires UF to improve evaluations, convince more of the right players to sign up, maintain their trust, effectively develop them, and remain vigilant in case fires need to be put out. Doing this will take a much better staff presence than we saw from the last regime, of course. But making sure of it probably requires that you throw more human resources at the problem, too.

Well, that’s exactly what Billy Napier is doing. First, he hired OL coach Rob Sale from the New York Giants to lead the group. Then, he took an unorthodox step by hiring a 2nd OL coach (former NFL lineman Darnell Stapleton) to his on-field staff. From there, Napier added 3 additional off-field staffers who will each focus on the offensive line. These include former UF OL Cheston Blackshear, long-time Louisiana staffer Mike Richard, and Shane Vallot, who played for Napier at ULL last season.

Regardless of who the hires turned out to be, featuring as many OL staffers as you have OL starters is a great first step. Many hands, as they say, makes light work. But this OL staff has a lengthy resume of personal success that should carry weight with recruits and current players alike.

As a former NFL coach (even if it was for only 1 year), Sale can pitch his understanding of what NFL teams want in a lineman. After starting for the Steelers in Super Bowl XLIII, Stapleton can offer his understanding of that journey from the player’s perspective. Being a former 2nd team All-SEC selection and contributor to UF’s 1996 National Championship team, Blackshear knows what it takes to dominate in the SEC. Also, as a former walk-on turned 2nd team All-Sun Belt selection, Vallot knows about overcoming adversity. Together, this young group (only 2 of the 5 are even in their 40s) should be well-equipped to flip the script of UF’s offensive line culture. Now, they just have to deliver.

Reason for optimism # 2 – Napier & Sale can recruit – Next, let’s talk about recruiting. Improvement here is absolutely non-negotiable, but Napier’s track record suggests that he knows what he’s doing. He first proved this as an assistant, where his success culminated in recognition as the nation’s #5 recruiting staffer by 247 Sports in 2014. After taking over as ULL’s head coach, Napier proved himself as a recruiting leader, when he twice signed the program’s highest ranked class ever in just 4 years.

But his ability to raise the recruiting bar at offensive line is also evident. When he and Rob Sale arrived in Lafayette, the 2-star fueled program had only managed to sign 4 OL prospects with a 3-star grade in the previous 16 years. Napier and Sale then casually exceeded that with 5 in their 2019 bump class alone. Offensive line recruiting improved so much during Napier’s 4 years there that he accounted for 10 of the top-15 highest rated prospects the school ever signed at the position.

To be fair however, there is a galaxy-sized difference between breaking into the 3-star and 5-star talent pools. ULL is clearly not UF and replicating such upward recruiting mobility is not a reasonable expectation. At the same time, evidence of plus recruiting is evidence of plus recruiting. UF has a big need for better performance here and the limited data we have suggests Napier may be capable of providing it.

Reason for optimism #3 – Proof of concept – The third reason for optimism is because Napier’s management of the position has yielded great results. His OLs were consistently good at ULL, but when Sale was there from 2018-2020, they became great. According to Football Outsiders’ advanced metrics, the 2019 Rajin’ Cajun OL had the 3rd best categorical ranking average nationally. The next year in 2020, they posted similar results, with a finish of 6th. Though they dipped to an above average overall ranking when Sale left for the NFL (46th in 2021), the unit still played well during the team’s Sun Belt Championship Run.

When you narrow focus to individual play, the success stories may be even more impressive. Napier produced ULL’s first 2 OL draft picks ever in 2020, when Robert Hunt and Kevin Dotson were taken in the 2nd and 4th rounds. While neither were Napier recruits, Max Mitchell is. Mitchell is currently ranked by Pro Football Focus as the 2022 draft’s #79 overall prospect and #11 tackle. If he is taken, then ULL will have had more OLs drafted since 2018 than UF (which has 2). Also, let’s not forget that 2021 ULL starter O’Cyrus Torrence was pursued by multiple SEC schools before following Napier to UF through the transfer portal.

Over the course of Napier’s tenure at ULL, his offensive linemen earned 11 All-Sunbelt Team awards. These included 4 named to the 1st team and multiple award winners in each of his 4 years at the school. This will be a key metric to follow at UF, because history says you don’t win the SEC without All-Conference linemen.

Napier’s class size & retention performance

If there is an area of potential concern based upon the data, it’s Napier’s class size consistency. While at ULL, his 4 classes featured, 3, 7, 2, then 3 offensive line prospects from 2018-2021. On the surface, this presents a miss of the target number in 3 of his 4 classes. There are some key contextual differences however, between these numbers and the UF class sizes discussed earlier. First, Napier didn’t wait until his 3rd class to sign high numbers as a desperate fix for earlier misses. The 7-man group came in his talent-rich 2nd class and completed a strong, 10-man haul over his first 2 years. Then, 2 starters opted to return for a 6th year of eligibility in 2020 (Cole Prudhomme & Ken Marks), making the 2-man 2020 OL class more understandable. Finally, as a smaller FBS school, ULL is more dependent upon transfers from year-to-year than UF should be. When factoring in the transfer additions of 1 OL in 2020 (4-star Zach Robertson), then 2 OLs in 2021 (T.J. Fiailoa & Matthew Anderson), Napier’s class sizes look fine.

On the player retention front, Napier’s numbers are right in line with most recent SEC Champions. Although his 4-year ULL totals are a small sample size, his OL attrition rate of 24% is very close to that Alabama (22%), Auburn (23%), and LSU (24%). While it trails the low rate of Georgia (14%), it remains far better than what we’ve seen at UF over the long term (43%) or even recently (Mullen’s rate was 33%)

Final Thoughts

After suffering through the long, slow descent of Gator offensive line play, I’m genuinely excited by Napier’s potential to turn things around. The guy seems to understand that recruiting is where you win the game and that now includes recruiting your current players to stay on campus. If he’s going to succeed however, it probably won’t be because Rob Sale is just THAT good at coaching offensive line. It’s also unlikely that Napier will fix things by finding “hidden gems” at a miraculous rate. Instead, it will probably be because his program infrastructure and recruiting expertise fuel a cleanup of the 3 failures I detailed in this article. Moving forward, I recommend that fans keep an eye on class size consistency, player retention, and recruit ranking as benchmarks of his efforts. If they each improve, we’ll probably, finally see some blocking progress from this Gator offensive line.

Notes

• All references to recruit and class rankings are based on the 247 Composite, an aggregate of each major recruiting service.
• Power Success Rate & Sack Rate are metrics provided by footballoutsiders.com
• Thanks to Swamp_Thing for providing data on Rob Sale and his performance at ULL!
• Class size methodology: A few players were included as OL signees for this project even though their original composite profiles designated them as defensive linemen. Examples of this include 2013 UF signee Antonio Riles and 2014 Georgia signee Lamont Gaillard. Likewise, a few signees listed as OLs were omitted when evidence existed that they were not recruited for the OL. These include 2014 UF signee Taven Bryan and 2017 UF signee TJ Slaton. Players who signed in multiple years after initially failing to qualify (like 2012 LSU signee Fehoko Fanaika) were only counted toward signee totals once. Walk-ons mistakenly listed as scholarship signees were omitted (like 2013 UGA signee Glenn Welch).