Florida falls to Tennessee

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Florida lost by five to Tennessee in Knoxville, 38-33. Considering the Gators came in as 10.5 point underdogs, they exceeded expectations.

Of course, there are no moral victories in college football. Florida now stands at 2-2 and 0-2 in the SEC. For all intents and purposes, the Gators have been eliminated from contention in the SEC East. That means there are still goals for the 2022 season to pursue, but the big ones are over just four games into the season.

But we learned a lot about this Florida team in the 60 minutes in Knoxville.

We learned that this team isn’t going to give up regardless of the circumstances. We learned that the defense is in need of a major overhaul. And we learned that Anthony Richardson may just be the quarterback that we thought he was coming into the season, at least at times.

You’d much rather learn all of those things in a win, but that isn’t the case. So the Gators are left licking their wounds, having a (hopefully) easier time with Eastern Washington next week and getting ready to pursue a bowl appearance because those practices are going to be important for next year’s squad.

That’s what’s left after this loss to Tennessee. The Vols went 7-6 last year, found out who their QB is and got situated with their new head coach’s system last season. This year, they’re 4-0.

Florida is positioned to do the same if they stay the course and keep working. Or they can let this loss snowball similarly to the birthday present the Hurricanes gave Mario Cristobal in a 45-31 shellacking from Middle Tennessee after falling flat against Texas A&M.

It’s time to get to work.

Napier’s decision-making

The most popular topic on my twitter feed after the game was Billy Napier’s decision-making when it came to going for two point conversions on the last two touchdowns. But I’m not sure evaluating those decisions makes much sense without evaluating his overall decision-making game plan.

Napier clearly believed his defense couldn’t stop Tennessee. That’s why he went for fourth downs on six separate occasions, including twice in his own territory.

If we look at those decisions in aggregate using the College Football 4^th Down Bot, here’s how those decisions rated along with two other fourth-down decisions:

Note that the bot didn’t rate the Johnson run for a TD at the end of the game, presumably because the winning percentage gained was so small either way that it didn’t think it was worth posting. Regardless, even if we take that one out of the equation, Napier made the right call in just about every case. The only one to quibble with is the decision to kick the 50-yard field goal, though that is considered a toss-up by the bot.

In aggregate, Napier raised Florida’s chances of winning 13.3 percent just by making the correct fourth down decisions according to this model. I have some quibbles with this particular model, but I think it does a good job of suggesting that Napier was making the right calls even when it seemed like those calls might be risky.

They weren’t risky. They were the right thing to do given the game and yardage situations.

So what about the two-pointers? Were those the right decisions analytically?

I have to admit that I texted good buddy Nick Knudsen about it as it was happening and luckily he was watching the game with an actuary who could explain it to us dullards and I think I agree with his assessment.

Down 17 points, Florida needed two touchdowns, two extra points and a field goal to tie the game. But even if they were able to get that, the Florida defense couldn’t stop Tennessee when they were trying to score. So what kind of disadvantage does that give you in overtime? 70-30? 60-40?

So what are the odds of converting a 2-point conversion? Well, we have that data and it’s somewhere between 40-50 percent historically so let’s peg that at 45 percent for this exercise.

Now let’s say that Napier hits the 2-pointer on the first try (and had Zipperer not tipped the ball, Shorter catches it for the conversion). Well, that means Florida is only a touchdown, extra point and field goal away from a win. So essentially Napier took a shot that he could win the game right there rather than relying on a tie getting him into overtime where his odds were worse.

But let’s take that further. Even though Napier was going for the win right there, he also left himself an out with the second 2-point conversion if he failed. That puts the odds even more in favor of going for it twice. And even with that second failure, Florida still got the ball back with a chance to heave it into the end zone.

We laud coaches who go for two pointers at the end of games when they’re down by one point as going for the win. That’s all Napier did here. Had the Gators kicked the extra point after the first touchdown, then gotten a field goal, then followed that up with a touchdown to get to within one, nobody would have questioned him going for two points for the win.

So if just modifying the order of events changes our opinion, that probably means that the math says our opinion is wrong.

Defensive Struggles

All of Napier’s decision-making was predicated on his assumption that his defense is absolutely awful.

Four games in, I think we can say that is unequivocally true. I also think it explains some of his aggressiveness on fourth down against Kentucky. While I still think some of those decisions were questionable, it makes a lot more sense in the shadow of the past two games for the Gators defense.

Florida faced nine Tennessee drives in the game and the Volunteers averaged 7.9 plays per drive along with 63.7 yards per drive. Florida stopped the Vols twice with fumbles after they had driven down the field, but other than that, it was a real struggle.

This isn’t a new trend. In Florida’s first four games this year, opponents’ drives have averaged 7.2 plays per drive and 40.8 yards per drive. That means that Florida’s offense is sitting on the sideline a lot and then forced to respond continuously after the defense gives up whatever advantage was just gained.

But the question is, why is the defense so bad? Well, as usual when things are this bad, it’s a combination of a bunch of things. The first thing that jumps out on film is not executing the scheme correctly.

You can see that on this play as Florida has three men covering two at the top of the screen and the same thing at the bottom when the defensive end drops into coverage. But that means it is a linebacker’s responsibility – in this case, Shemar James, #6 – to cover the running back out of the backfield.

But James doesn’t move when the back motions out into the flat. That leaves only Rashad Torrence (#22) as the only man free to tackle the running back, but Torrence started the play 20-yards downfield.

It wasn’t just James who made this mistake. Later on the exact same thing was screwed up by way more experienced players. This was an absolute killer because Tennessee had just gotten a holding call on a Hooker TD run that backed them up and made it look like Florida might get a stop.

I’m not sure whether this is Jason Marshall’s (#3) or Amari Burney’s (#2) fault. I’m inclined to think it’s Burney because of the way Marshall plays outside leverage, but he’s either supposed to pass off the Tennessee wide receiver to Burney and take the running back in the flat or Burney is supposed to take the running back in the flat on what is essentially a wheel route.

Instead, they both take the receiver and it’s an easy touchdown pass for Hendon Hooker to his running back.

This is exactly what happened on the other backbreaking play that happened right after the Anthony Richardson fumble.

It’s unclear to me who is at fault. I’m sure Trey Dean (#0) will get plenty of criticism for this one because of the one that was so clearly his fault earlier, but I can’t be sure here. If Toney called man coverage, the tight end would be Dean’s man, but that clearly isn’t the case because the linebackers drop into a zone at the snap. If Toney called quarters coverage, the outside linebacker (in this case, Dean) would take the wheel. But if Toney called cover-3, then the corner has responsibility for the deep outside third.

Regardless, you can see that at the point where I pause the play, Florida has four defenders guarding the post and nobody out on the tight end running the wheel.

And of course, we have this debacle.

I have no idea what Trey Dean (#0) is doing here. He is responsible for the inside receiver. There isn’t anyone else out on that side who could be. Maybe (if we’re being really generous), we could say that he is expecting safety help, which is weird because Rashad Torrence (#22) is on the other side of the field. Regardless, there is nothing but green grass behind him and when the receiver runs there, nobody in Gator colors ran there to cover him.

This is an unacceptable bust. Not only had Florida just worked really had to go up 7-3, but to give up this kind of yardage because one person didn’t know what the play call was has to be disheartening.

The second thing that is hampering the defense is the play calling. Napier is going to get criticism for calling a timeout with 90 second left in the first half trying to get Tennessee to punt, but it was really the defensive call after Tennessee got the first down that flummoxed me.

Tennessee was left with a first-and-10 with 85 second left at its own 22. The only way they score more than three points is if the Gators defense gives up a big play. So why is Rashad Torrence creeping up towards the line of scrimmage before the snap? It is a dead giveaway to Tennessee QB Hendon Hooker that he will have one-on-one coverage to that side – the perfection condition to take a deep shot.

Hooker takes the shot. Jason Marshall gets beaten on a fantastic catch by Tennessee. But why is Florida blitzing in this situation rather than making Tennessee throw underneath and use clock?

Ok, so maybe you’d excuse the Gators for being aggressive. That’s just who they are and so they’re going to go down blitzing regardless of the down and situation? Well, then why did they run this two plays later?

The two circles show that Florida has three men covering two receivers on each side of the field. With Ventrell Miller also going into coverage, that means the Gators have seven defenders dropping into coverage. But they didn’t drop into zone coverage. This is zone deep with man coverage underneath, the perfect condition to give a running QB open running lanes.

This will prevent a deep shot. And you’d hope your defensive line would keep Hooker contained. I’m just confused why this coverage is called here and not two plays earlier as well. Let him run for 18 yards from his own 22 and you’re looking at Tennessee having to scramble to get into field goal range. Let him run for 18 yards from his own 20 and you’re looking at Tennessee having multiple shots into the end zone to end the half.

The third issue is that even when the scheme is called well and understood, Florida’s defenders don’t end up in the right position.

Amari Burney actually played this pretty well and it certainly looked cool when he tossed the running back out of the way coming to block him. But Hooker had time to make this throw. The only reason he didn’t is that Florida dropped a defensive lineman (circled) right into the path of where he wanted to go with the ball. Once he double-clutched, Burney was able to get home.

But the linebackers weren’t able to get home very often when they blitzed.

On this play, both Burney and Ventrell Miller blitz. But without dropping anyone else into coverage, this leaves Tre’vez Johnson isolated in one-on-one coverage. When the blitz can’t get home, Johnson gets beaten for a big gain. This isn’t all on the linebackers. But you can’t blitz two guys and not have one come free. Instead, Miller gets caught up in traffic and Hooker has plenty of time to deliver the ball.

And then there are the plays where  Florida turns short gains into long ones.

On this play, Florida drops linebacker Shemar James (#6, circled) into the middle of the field, acting a little bit like a spy on Hooker. Hooker somehow escapes the pocket but the Gators have him bottled up for maybe a 10-yard gain. There are three defenders coming from the inside and Tre’vez Johnson (#16) ready to force him back inside.

But Johnson cuts inside rather than taking on the blocker. That allows Hooker to cut to the outside and the blocker to get in the way of James, who had come over to make the tackle. Ventrell Miller has to come completely across the field to make the tackle, all because Johnson didn’t force Hooker back inside.

The result of all of this is that Florida’s defense almost always looks out of place or ill-prepared. Some of that is youth, some of it is scheme, some of it is understanding and some of it is just toughness and physically making a play.

Hendon Hooker is good. But a QB rating of 206.8 and a Yards Above Replacement (YAR) – my proprietary stat for measuring a QBs performance both running and throwing the ball – of 5.00 is ridiculous. There was no way for the Gators offense to keep up.

Florida’s Offense

The Gators’ offense was excellent in this game. It wasn’t perfect and so wasn’t able to win the game, but when you put up 594 yards, 6.8 yards per play and 8 20-plus yard plays, you should win the game.

The Richardson fumble was a killer, but only because this game felt exactly like the LSU game last year where Anthony Richardson led the Gators up and down the field only to go to the sideline and watch his defense piss away all of his hard work almost immediately.

Tennessee’s defense proved that its early numbers against the run don’t seem to be a fluke, holding the Gators to 42 carries for 141 yards and Gators backs to 79 yards on 25 carries (3.2 yards per rush). What they couldn’t do was contain Anthony Richardson, who roared back in this game with a vengeance after two horrible performances against Kentucky and USF.

There will be much made of his 17 rushes, but I think more should be made of his 69 percent usage rate. Richardson was the entire offense and he nearly delivered despite limited help from his teammates.

So what changed? Well, I think we can explain that with two of his shorter throws.

This play came just a few plays before the laser to Keon Zipperer for a TD but was critical to keeping the drive going. It’s a third-and-6 and Tennessee brought a zone blitz. Their outside linebacker (arrow) rushes while the middle linebacker and other outside linebacker drop into coverage. Richardson reads it perfectly and delivers the ball to Dante Zanders in the space vacating by the blitzing linebacker.

The other play that jumped out to me is this one. Tennessee rushes three linemen and have a spy for Richardson. There are only 52 second left so it would make sense if Richardson tried to drive the ball down the field. But instead he finds his check down and gets the ball out.

I would have liked to see Chiaokhiao-Bowman get out of bounds and save a couple of seconds, but sometimes you have to take a 10-yard gain when the defense gives it to you. Richardson wasn’t willing to do that against Kentucky or USF, so the fact that he was willing to do it against Tennessee late is a sign of significant progress.

Even though he threw for 453 yards, Richardson’s QB rating of 151.5 is good, but not great. He still struggles with accuracy (55%), but his ability to hit explosive plays in the passing game and supplement that as a threat on the ground means that his YAR for the game was 2.00, which is borderline Heisman level.

Had you told me we were getting Heisman-level AR, I would’ve said Florida could hang with the Vols. That’s what we got.

Takeaway

I’m encouraged by two things in this game.

First, Anthony Richardson looked like the QB that we saw last season in flashes. We knew there might be some growing pains and this was definitely a high ceiling performance for AR. But what that also means is that we’ve had two good and two bad performances from Richardson. His season QB rating of 111.7 is poor. His season YAR of 0.04 means that he’s been average.

This Florida team isn’t going anywhere significant with an average Anthony Richardson. He maybe doesn’t need to be this special every game, but the ups and downs of the roller coaster he’s had us on to start the season needs to level out a little bit.

But he was much more consistent against Tennessee on the throws he should complete. Multiple times there were opportunities where his throws would have flown right over his receivers the past two games and instead he put it right there. Whether that’s been because of health or trying not to run or something else, the fact that he was on the money tonight says he can do it.

Now he just has to do it every time.

I’m also encouraged by Billy Napier. He clearly went into this game with a game plan and he stuck to his guns throughout.

Some of that meant taking chances on fourth downs that raised some eyebrows. Some of that meant going for two points where it wasn’t intuitive to do so. Some of that meant running Richardson and risking injury because that’s what was necessary to win the game.

But even if he’d come into Knoxville with a conservative game plan, his decision to stick with what he believed in should please all Gators fans. Dan Mullen could draw up an offensive game plan with ease. What he couldn’t do was stick to a process for building a program.

This is just one game for Napier, but given his reputation as a program building, this gives some insight into how he makes decisions. I am a fan.

But good grief, is it depressing to watch this defense.

I spent two hours collecting clips after the game to show and left a bunch on the cutting room floor because they just reinforced points I had already made. Sure, there isn’t enough talent on that side of the ball. But sometimes getting off the field requires somebody to make an extraordinary effort. We saw that when Ventrell Miller punched the ball out on Tennessee’s opening drive, but those sorts of plays have been few and far between.

The Gators have been especially bad on third down, having allowed 52 percent of third downs to be converted  in the first four games (61.5% vs. Utah, 30.8% vs. UK, 53.3% vs. USF and 66.7% vs. UT). That just isn’t good enough, no matter what players you have on the field.

So that comes back to Napier and Patrick Toney. In his postgame press conference, Napier said he suspected that when he looked at the film, he thought there’d be 12-15 plays where Florida beat Florida. Those are going to have to stop, and we’re going to have to see this defense making progress or the young guys getting more playing time.

Because Florida has showed it can hold an opponent in check enough to win (vs. Kentucky). They’ve also shown that they can play efficiently on offense (vs. Tennessee). What they haven’t been able to show is that they can put those sorts of performances together in the same game.

There are positives to take out of this game. But those positives are all just moral victories at this point. And as Napier said during his press conference, there aren’t any moral victories in the SEC.